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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE 
HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs-
Appellants, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFFf PERRY K. BIGELOW 
and NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 20,318 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether or not the trial court erred in refusina 
to disturb its earlier judgment with respect to certain 
property which was quieted in plaintiffs and from which 
judgment defendant Cluff did not file a cross appeal. 
2. Whether or not the trial court erred in including 
in its order on remand the following statement: "That all of 
the claims raised by the defendants against the plaintiffs in 
Civil No. 53,243 have been decided and are res judicata." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs brought this action seeking to auiet title 
to certain property shown as Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A 
attached hereto. Defendant Cluff counterclaimed attempting 
to quiet title to that same property by virtue of the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence and also to quiet title to Parcel 
W-X-Y-Z shown on Exhibit A. The trial court quieted title to 
Parcel P-M-N-0 in defendants Cluff and Bigelow and quieted 
title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z in plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed 
from the court's ruling with respect to the P-M-N-0 parcel 
and defendant Cluff did not file a cross appeal with respect 
to the court's ruling on the W-X-Y-Z parcel. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's 
judgment with respect to the P-M-N-0 parcel and remanded the 
case to the District Court for the entry of a new decree with 
respect to that parcel. Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P. 2d 500 
(Utah, 1984). A copy of the ruling entered by the court upon 
remand and the order which was entered pursuant thereto are 
attached hereto as Exhibits B and C respectively. 
On this appeal, defendant Cluff alleges the trial 
court erred in refusing to disturb its prior findings and 
judgment regarding the W-X-Y-Z parcel because of defendant 
Cluff's failure to file a cross appeal. Defendant Cluff also 
contends that paragragh #2 of Exhibit C does not reflect the 
court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
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Inasmuch as defendant Cluff's appeal is based upon 
issues of law presented to the trial court on remand, a 
statement of facts is unnecessary to the resolution of this 
appeal beyond what has been stated in the preceeding sections. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' arguments with respect to the first issue 
presented for review may be summarized as follows: 
1. Defendant Cluff failed to file a cross-appeal with 
respect to the trial court's judgment regarding Parcel 
W-X-Y-Z and therefore that portion of the court's judgment is 
not subject to a modification on appeal or on remand from the 
appeal. 
2. In the course of the trial, defendant Cluff conceded 
that plaintiffs were entitled to Parcel W-X-Y-Z by virtue of 
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and therefore an 
appeal from the portion of the court's judgment dealing with 
that parcel would not be appropriate. 
3. The opinion of the court in Halladay v. Cluff, 
supra, does not add a new element to the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence, but merely clarifies prior cases which 
recognize the element of dispute or uncertainty. Defendant 
Cluff could have and should have raised that element as a 
defense to plaintiff's claim to boundary by acquiescence with 
respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z if in fact defendant Cluff had a 
-3-
defense to plaintiff's claim. Defendant Cluff's failure to 
do so either in the lower court or on the prior appeal, 
precludes her from asserting that position on this appeal. 
4. Defendant Cluff miscontrues the court's instructions 
on remand. The court reversed the trial court's ruling with 
respect to Parcel A-B-C-D (which includes Parcel P-M-N-O) and 
directed that the trial court enter a new decree in conformity 
with the opinion of the court. The court instructions by no 
means intimated that the trial court's decree should be 
modified with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z. 
With respect to defendant's argument that paragraph 2 of 
the order attached hereto as Exhibit C should be stricken, it 
should be noted that that paragraph merely states what the 
effect of the order would be without that express language. 
The effect of the court's order without that language would 
be to preclude defendant Cluff from again asserting claims 
against plaintiffs with respect to either Parcel P-M-N-0 or 
Parcel W-X-Y-Z. Therefore, there is no reason to exclude 
paragraph 2 from the court's order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
DEFENDANT CLUFF HAVING ACQUIESCED IN THE JUDGMENT 
RELATING TO PARCEL W-X-Y-Z AND HAVING FAILED TO FILE 
A CROSS-APPEAL THEREFROM, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
LEFT UNDISTURBED ITS JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT THERETO 
UPON REMAND FROM THIS COURT. 
In this action plaintiffs sought to quiet title to 
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Parcel P-M-N-0 on Exhibit A by virtue of a recorded deed, 
and also to quiet title to Parcel W-X-Y-Z on Exhibit A by 
virtue of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Defendant 
Cluff asserted title to Parcel P-M-N-0 by virtue of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. This court having 
ruled against defendant Cluff with respect to Parcel P-M-N-O, 
defendant Cluff is now attempting to reverse the trial 
court's order, from which no cross-appeal was filed, with 
respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z. 
Defendant Cluffs argument in this regard is that it 
would be ludicrous for her to file a cross-appeal from a 
judgment she believes she won. Yet, with respect to Parcel 
W-X-Y-Z it is clear that defendant Cluff lost. In fact, 
during the course of the trial, defendant Cluff conceded that 
plaintiffs were entitled to Parcel W-X-Y-Z by virtue of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence and that issue was never 
submitted to the court for decision. During plaintiff's 
cross examination of defendant Cluff the court called a bench 
conference with counsel. After the conference, which was had 
off the record, the court stated: 
THE COURT: As a result of a Bench Conference I think 
there is no issue on that particular area, Mr. Young. 
MR. YOUNG: The area of W",X",Y", and Z" on Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 8? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Trial Transcript page 134. Record at 173). 
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Thereafter, defendant Cluff did not claim an interest in 
Parcel W-X-Y-Z. Consequently, defendant Cluff did not file a 
cross appeal with respect to the W-X-Y-Z property at the time 
plaintiffs1 appealled from the court's decision with respect 
to Parcel P-M-N-O. 
Accordingly, not only did defendant Cluff fail to file a 
cross appeal as required by Rule 74(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (in effect at that time), but defendant Cluff would 
not have been entitled to prevail on any such cross appeal by 
virtue of conceding the issue in the trial court. Defendant 
Cluff would therefore have no grounds to appeal from an issue 
to which she stipulated. 
In any event, defendant Cluff having failed to comply with 
Rule 74(b), defendant Cluff is now precluded from objecting to 
that portion of the court's order dealing with the W-X-Y-Z 
property. This court has consistently held that the failure to 
comply with Rule 74(b) precludes the consideration of issues 
from which no appeal has been taken. Bentley v. Potter, 
694 P. 2d 617 (Utah 1984); Cerritos Trucking Company v. Utah 
Venture No. 1, 645 P. 2d 608 (Utah 1982); Terry v. Zions 
Cooperative Mercantile Institute, 617 P. 2d 700 (Utah 1980); 
and Eliason v. Watts, 615 P. 2d 427 (Utah 1980). In Terry v. 
Zions Cooperative Mercantile Institute, supra, Rule 74(b) was 
discussed in some length. In that case the court stated: 
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The rule which deals with the problem of cross-appeals 
is Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P., which states: 
"For any one or more parties who have filed a 
notice of appeal as required by Rule 73, other 
parties may separately or together cross-appeal 
without filing a notice a appeal; provided, 
however, such party or parties shall file a 
statement of points on which he intends to rely on 
such cross-appeal within the time and as required 
by subdivision (b) of Rule 75." 
As to the time limitation, Rule 75(b) states: 
"If the respondent desires to cross-appeal, 
or if the appellant has filed a statement of the 
points... and the respondent desires to have the 
appellate court consider other or additonal matters, 
the respondent shall, within 10 days after the service 
and filing of appellant's designation... serve and 
file a statement of respondent's points either by way 
of such cross-appeal or for the purpose of having 
considered other or additional matters than those 
raised by the appellant." 
From the just quoted rules it could hardly be clearer 
that if a respondent desires to attack the judgment and 
change it in his favor, he must timely file a cross-appeal 
which plainly states the propositions he intends to rely 
on as entitling him to relief. This conforms with the 
desired objective of giving his opponent and the court a 
clear and definite understanding of the issues to be 
treated and of thus providing a firm foundation upon 
which the case is to proceed. (Emphasis in original). 
617 P. 2d 701. 
Defendant Cluff having failed to file and perfect a 
cross-appeal, the district court correctly refused to disturb 
its findings as to Parcel W-X-Y-Z. 
Defendant Cluff contends that this court's decision 
in Halladay v. Cluff, supra, added an element to the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence and that based on the added 
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element, plaintiffs are not entitled to prevail with respect 
to Parcel W-X-Y-Z. However, this court's opinion in Halladay 
v. Cluff, supra, merely clarifies the elements of boundary by 
acquiescence which have been stated in prior cases. The 
element of dispute or uncertainty had been recognized prior 
to the trial of this case and in fact plaintiffs argued that 
principle to the trial court. See Halladay v. Cluff, supra, 
at pp. 504-505. Defendant Cluff could have made the same 
argument with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z but failed to do 
so. 
Defendant Cluff further contends that this court's 
statement in the prior appeal that "[T]he decree is reversed, 
and the case is remanded to the District Court for the entry 
of a new decree in conformity with this opinion," entitles 
defendant Cluff to a reversal of the trial court's judgment 
with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z. Defendant Cluff reasons that 
since the trial court applied the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence to both Parcel W-X-Y-Z and Parcel P-M-N-O, that 
if this court reversed the lower court with regard to Parcel 
P-M-N-O, that on remand, the trial court should have also 
reversed as to Parcel W-X-Y-Z. Defendant Cluff is attempting 
to persuade this court that either the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence applies to both parcels or it does not apply 
to either parcel. The underlying facts so not appear to be 
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significant to defendant Cluff. Obviously, this argument is 
nonsense. Defendant Cluff even recognized one distinguishing 
factual circumstance in her brief. 
The trial court recognized and counsel conceded that the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence clearly applied to 
Parcel W-X-Y-Z and consequently that issue was not contested. 
However, the applicability of boundary by acquiescence with 
respect to Parcel P-M-N-0 was contested, was litigated, and 
the trial court was found to be in error by this court in the 
earlier appeal. 
Defendant Cluff is reading too much into the court's 
statement cited above. Defendant Cluff fails to quote other 
statements of the court in that opinion such as the following: 
On appeal the Halladays seek to overturn that 
decision on the basis that boundary by acquiescence 
cannot be applied where there was no dispute or 
uncertainty concerning the location of the boundary. 
We agree and reverse with directions to quiet title in 
the Halladays, the record owners. 
* * * 
Consequently, the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
is inapplicable as a matter of law in the circumstances 
of this case. The decree relying on that doctrine in 
quieting the claimants1 title to Parcel A-B-C-D must 
therefore be reversed. 
The decree is reversed and the case is remanded 
to the District Court for the entry of a new decree 
in conformity with this opinion. 
685 P. 2d 502, 507-508. 
To be in conformity with this court's opinion, the trial 
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court on remand could only modify that portion of the judgment 
dealing with Parcel A-B-C-D (which includes Parcel P-M-N-O) 
and had no authority to modify the judgment with respect to 
Parcel W-X-Y-Z. Defendant Cluff's appeal in this case is not 
well taken. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court 
affirm the order of the lower court which is attached hereto 
as Exhibit C. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ENTERED UPON REMAND OF 
THIS CASE HAS THE EFFECT OF RES JUDICATA AS TO 
THE ISSUES RAISED IN THIS ACTION. 
Defendant Cluff's second point on appeal was that para-
graph #2 of the court's order attached hereto as Exhibit C 
should be stricken. That statement reads as follows: 
2. That all of the claims raised by the defendants 
as against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53f243 have been 
decided and are res judicata. 
That statement was placed in the order in light of defendant 
Cluff's argument to the trial court that title to Parcel 
W-X-Y-Z should be quieted in defendant Cluff. The effect of 
the order with respect to that parcel of property is the same 
with or without the cited language. The order has the effect 
of precluding defendant Cluff from again raising any issues 
with regard to the W-X-Y-Z property by virtue of the doctrine 
of res judicata without the order expressly so stating. 
Therefore, there would be no reason to eliminate that language 
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and the court's order should stand as is. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Cluff having conceded to the trial court's 
judgment with respect to Parcel W-X-Y-Z and having failed to 
perfect any cross-appeal with respect to that property, and 
the court's order entered upon remand of the case from this 
court having the effect of res judicata with respect to that 
property, plaintiffs respectfully request that the court's 
order entered October 18, 1984 be affirmed. 
Dated this 3 day of April, 1985. 
BRENT D. YOUNG/) 
Attorney for Ij(espondents 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents, 
postage prepaid, to S. Rex Lewis, Esq., Attorney for Defendant 
Bigelow, and to M. Dayle Jeffs, Esq., Attorney for Defendant 
Cluff, addressed follows this day of April, 1985. 
S. REX LEWIS 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorney at Law 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
M. DAYLE JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorney at Law 
90 North 100 East 
Provo, Utah 84601 
BRENT D. £OUN 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and Civil No. 53243 
MERLE HALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. R U L I N G 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. 
BIGELOW and NORMA G. 
BIGELOW, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on the 21st day of September, 
1984, wherein the Court heard oral argument from counsel as to the dis-
position to be made of this case on remand from the Supreme Court, and 
all of counsel were heard and the Court having thoroughly.the alterna-
tives, and the language of the Supreme Court directing that they 
" . . . reverse with directions to quiet title in the Halladays, the 
record owners." 
It is noted that the defendants Halladay appealed from the Court1< 
Ruling as to that portion of Defendants' Exhibit 12 identified as "A", 
"B", "C", "D" or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal was taken as to the 
Court's fir:dine of boundary bv accuiescence as to Tracts 1 and 2 in 
Bicelow and Cluff respectively. Therefore, the only matter before the 
Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3 and that the same be quieted m 
the record owners. The Court therefore directs counsel for Halladays 
to prepare a new Decree quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3 
alona the description contained from points "A" to^'B" to "C" to "D". 
Dated a: Provo, Utah County, Utah, this J-7 day of September, 
1984. 
GEOR^^E. L^LI^T" JUD9E 
BRENT D. YOUNG 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, UT 84603 
Telephone: 37 5-3000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MACK HALLADAY and MERLE 
KALLADAY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MADGE CLUFF, PERRY K. BIGELOW 
and NORMA G. BIGELOW, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 53,243 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the court on the 21st day of September, 
1984, wherein the court heard oral argument from counsel as to 
the disposition to be made of this case on remand from the 
Supreme Court, and all of counsel were heard and the court having 
thoroughly considered the alternatives, and the language of the 
Supreme Court directing that they " . . . reverse with directions 
to quiet title in the Halladays, the record owners." 
It is noted that the plaintiffs Halladay appealed from the 
court's ruling as to that portion of defendant's Exhibit 12 
identified as "A,T, "E", "C", f,Dn or Parcel 3, and no cross appeal 
was taken as to the court's finding of boundary by acquiescence 
as to Tracts 1 and 2 in Bigelow and Cluff respectively. Therefore, 
the only matter before the Supreme Court had to do with Parcel 3 
and that the saire be cuieted in the record owners. The court 
therefore directs counsel for Halladays to prepare a new decree 
quieting title in the Halladays as to Parcel 3 along the des-
cription contained froir, points "A" to "Bw to "C" to "D\ 
Based upon the foregoing IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That title to the following described property is 
is quieted in plaintiffs, Kack Halladay and Merle Halladay: 
Commencing 488.08 feet West and 495.00 feet North 
from the Southeast corner of Section 2, Township 7 
South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
thence West 118.10 feet, thence North 0° 03' 17" 
East along a fence line 55.31 feet, thence South 89° 
51 f 20" East along a fence line 118.20 feet thence 
South 0° 09' 25" West along a fence line, 55.01 feet 
to the point of beginning. Area .15 acres. 
2. That all other claims raised by the defendants as 
against the plaintiffs in Civil No. 53,243 have been decided and 
are res judicata. 
Dated: October / !f , 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
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